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Escaping Mass Education – Why Harvard Pays

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Author Info
Bergh, Andreas () (Department of Economics, Lund University)
Fink, Günther () (Bocconi University)

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Abstract

Private universities, as opposed to publicly financed ones, are dominant in some countries and almost non-existent in others. We develop a dynamic model to demonstrate that private providers emerge as soon as they can profitably sell an elite signal to the most highly talented. As private providers engage in cream skimming, the returns to publicly provided education decreases, but the average return to higher education increases because of the signaling benefit created. We use numerical simulations to demonstrate the dynamic implications of our model, and provide some basic empirical evidence in support of the theory presented

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File URL: http://www.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/Papers/WP05_2.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2005:2.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 11 Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2005_002

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/
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Related research
Keywords: Higher education; tertiary education; Signaling;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lang, Kevin & Kropp, David, 1986. "Human Capital versus Sorting: The Effects of Compulsory Attendance Laws," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 609-24, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kelly Bedard, 2001. "Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 749-775, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Weiss, Andrew, 1995. "Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 133-54, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Koichi Futagami & Shingo Ishiguro, 2004. "Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 129-146, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Igal Hendel & Joel Shapiro & Paul Willen, 2001. "Educational Opportunity and the College Premium," Economics Working Papers 560, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bergh, Andreas & Fink, Günther, 2006. "Higher Education: Does Public Expenditure Increase Enrollment?," Ratio Working Papers 84, The Ratio Institute. [Downloadable!]
  7. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, 1999. "Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables," NBER Working Papers 7322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-23.


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