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Coups and Economic Crises

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Abstract

This paper explores whether coups cause increased crisis risk, and if some types of coups are associated with stronger risk. I use a worldwide sample with data on more than 1200 onsets of economic crises between 1950 and 2019, treat separate effects of military and civilian coup attempts, and distinguish between failed and successful coups. The data reveal that economic crises are primarily induced by successful coups, and by coups that result in regime change towards civilian autocracy from both democracy and military dictatorship.

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  • Bjørnskov, Christian, 2022. "Coups and Economic Crises," Working Paper Series 1449, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1449
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democracy; Autocracy; Regime Types; Crisis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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