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Adverse Selection and Search Frictions in Corporate Loan Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Beyhaghi, Mehdi

    (College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio)

  • Mahmoudi, Babak

    (School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nazarbayev University)

  • Mohammadi, Ali

    (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology)

Abstract

We provide empirical evidence of both (1) price dispersion and (2) credit rationing in the corporate loan market. We argue that these properties are caused by two factors: an adverse selection resulting from the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, and search frictions in matching borrowers with lenders. We develop a model of loan markets in which lenders post an array of heterogeneous contracts, then borrowers tradeoff terms of loan contracts and matching probability between themselves. We show that a unique separating equilibrium exists where each type of borrower applies to a certain type of contract.

Suggested Citation

  • Beyhaghi, Mehdi & Mahmoudi, Babak & Mohammadi, Ali, 2014. "Adverse Selection and Search Frictions in Corporate Loan Contracts," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 350, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0350
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
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    3. Joshua D. Rauh & Amir Sufi, 2010. "Capital Structure and Debt Structure," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(12), pages 4242-4280, December.
    4. Veronica Guerrieri & Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, 2010. "Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(6), pages 1823-1862, November.
    5. Carlo Altomonte & Tommaso Aquilante, 2012. "The EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-Unicredit dataset," Working Papers 753, Bruegel.
    6. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    loan contract; capital structure; debt heterogeneity; adverse selection; competitive search;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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