on ‘efficient breach’, are important for the choice of contract breach

remedy. Empirically we find that specific performance is almost never

claimed in Civil Law countries. It involves forcing a party in breach to

perform actions while damages involves extracting only a monetary

payment. The former is more difficult and more coercive. We study

enforcement rules of Denmark, France and Germany. Enforcement of

specific performance is absent in Denmark and weak in France. In

Germany it seems stricter, which points to the importance of costs of

enforcement to the claimant.

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Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance in its series Working Papers with number 2000-10.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 01 May 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsfin:2000_010

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Keywords: Law;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
A00 - General Economics and Teaching - - General - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
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1. Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Aaron Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1155, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1997. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," NBER Working Papers 5007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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