This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Insurance and monopoly power in a mixed private/public hospital system, CHERE Discussion Paper No 55

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Donald J Wright () (Department of Economics, University of Sydney)
Abstract

Consumers, when ill, often have the choice of being treated for free in a public hospital or at a positive price in a private hospital. To compensate for the positive price, private hospitals offer a higher quality treatment. Private hospitals and doctors also have a degree of monopoly power in their pricing. In this setting, it is shown that the presence of insurance does not affect the number of consumers treated in the private hospital, rather the private hospital and the doctor respond to the presence of insurance by increasing the prices they charge and the quality of the private hospital experience.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.chere.uts.edu.au/pdf/dp55.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by CHERE, University of Technology, Sydney in its series Discussion Papers with number 55.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:her:chedps:55

Contact details of provider:
Postal: PO Box 123 Broadway NSW 2007, Level 2, Block D, Building 5, 1-59 Quay Street Haymarket NSW 2000
Phone: 61 2 9514 4720
Fax: 61 2 9514 4730
Email:
Web page: http://www.chere.uts.edu.au
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Liz Chinchen).

Related research
Keywords: Physician payments

Find related papers by JEL classification:
I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson & William B. Vogt, 2000. "Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second-Best in Health Care Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 992-1005, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Chiu, W. Henry, 1997. "Health insurance and the welfare of health care consumers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 125-133, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About five million pdf files are downloaded through RePEc every year.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.