Do Prices Determine Vertical Integration? Evidence from Trade Policy
Abstract
What is the relationship between product prices and vertical integration? While the literature has focused on how integration affects prices, this paper shows that prices can affect integration. Many theories in organizational economics and industrial organization posit that integration, while costly, increases productivity. If true, it follows from firms' maximizing behavior that higher prices cause firms to choose more integration. The reason is that at low prices, increases in revenue resulting from enhanced productivity are too small to justify the cost, whereas at higher prices, the revenue benefit exceeds the cost. Trade policy provides a source of exogenous price variation to assess the validity of this prediction: higher tariffs should lead to higher prices and therefore to more integration. We construct firm-level indices of vertical integration for a large set of countries and industries and exploit cross-section and time-series variation in import tariffs to examine their impact on firm boundaries. Our empirical results provide strong support for the view that output prices are a key determinant of vertical integration.Download Info
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Paper provided by Harvard Business School in its series Harvard Business School Working Papers with number 10-060.Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision: May 2013
Handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:10-060
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Related research
Keywords: Theory of the firm; vertical integration; product prices.;Other versions of this item:
- Laura Alfaro & Paola Conconi & Harald Fadinger & Andrew F. Newman, 2010. "Do Prices Determine Vertical Integration? Evidence from Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 16118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alfaro, Laura & Conconi, Paola & Fadinger, Harald & Newman, Andrew, 2012. "Do Prices Determine Vertical Integration? Evidence from Trade Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 9200, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-26 (All new papers)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eric Van den Steen, 2005.
"Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 256-283, April.
- Van den Steen, Eric, 2003. "Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision," Working papers 4224-01, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Buehler, Stefan & Burghardt, Dirk, 2013. "Globalization and Vertical Structure: An Empirical Investigation," Economics Working Paper Series 1310, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
- Pedro Mendi & Rafael Moner-Colonques & José Sempere-Monerris, 2011. "Vertical integration, collusion, and tariffs," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 359-378, September.
- Pol Antràs, 2011.
"Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production,"
NBER Working Papers
17470, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Antràs, Pol, 2011. "Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production," CEPR Discussion Papers 8598, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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