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Survivors Benefits and Conjugal Behavior. Evidence from the Netherlands

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  • Julie Tréguier

    (INED - Institut national d'études démographiques, IPP - Institut des politiques publiques, EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Simon Rabaté

    (CPB - Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of survivors insurance on marital behavior. We study the 1996 Dutch reform which considerably tightened eligibility rules to survivors' benefits. Exploiting a discontinuity in date of birth eligibility to survivors insurance and using a rich and exhaustive of the Dutch population administrative dataset, we carry out a regression discontinuity design and we find no evidence of the reform on divorce probability. Exploring possible explanations for our zero-effect result, we study how labor supply responses can compensate the income drop the reform induced. We find a strong increase in the labor force participation of widows after the reform. However this response does not completely offset the decrease in income generated form the cut in survivors benefits.

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  • Julie Tréguier & Simon Rabaté, 2021. "Survivors Benefits and Conjugal Behavior. Evidence from the Netherlands," Working Papers halshs-03156317, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03156317
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03156317
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Giulia Giupponi, 2019. "When income effects are large: labor supply responses and the value of welfare transfers," CEP Discussion Papers dp1651, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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