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Institutionnalisation des régimes de gouvernance et rôle des institutions socles : le cas de la cogestion allemande

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Wirtz

    (Laboratoire de Recherche Magellan - UJML - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon 3 - Université de Lyon - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Lyon)

  • Pierre-Yves Gomez

    (EM - EMLyon Business School)

Abstract

Codetermined supervisory boards with half of the directors representing employees are one of the distinctive features of the German corporate governance system. This is often supposed to be rooted in typically "German culture". The present contribution reveals however that this supposedly "German tradition" is a myth. The specific regime of codetermined supervisory boards is rather the outcome of the dramatic political and institutional circumstances of the late nineteen-forties, having witnessed a fierce fight and the mobilization of various actors ranging from politicians and industrialists to trade unionists. On the way to an institutional consensus, the German catholic church played a significant, albeit seldom recognized, role. It acted as a "base institution" positively influencing the efforts of mobilization in favor of board codetermination and making an agreement possible.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Wirtz & Pierre-Yves Gomez, 2008. "Institutionnalisation des régimes de gouvernance et rôle des institutions socles : le cas de la cogestion allemande," Post-Print halshs-00746276, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00746276
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bernard Laurent & Peter Wirtz, 2013. "Founder-CEO values, the conception of ownership and governance models illustrated in a case study of Auchan," Working Papers halshs-00796728, HAL.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4821 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cogestion; mobilisation; institution socle; église catholique;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • P11 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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