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Composition du conseil d'administration et gestion opportuniste des résultats

Author

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  • Hamadi Matoussi

    (LIGUE - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire en Gestion : Université-Entreprise - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche)

  • Imen Mahfoudh

    (FSEG - Université de Sfax - University of Sfax)

Abstract

Cette étude examine le rôle de la composition du conseil d'administration dans la surveillance de la pratique de gestion des résultats, telle que mesurée par la valeur absolue des accruals discrétionnaires. En utilisant un modèle de régression linéaire, cet article montre qu'une proportion élevée d'administrateurs externes, la séparation entre les fonctions de présidence du conseil et de direction générale et un large conseil d'administration contraignent le dirigeant à s'engager dans une gestion opportuniste des résultats. Toutefois, avec l'utilisation du modèle à deux régimes avec affectation endogène non observable, les résultats montrent qu'une large proportion d'administrateurs externes et la séparation entre les fonctions de présidence du conseil et de direction générale contraignent réellement la gestion opportuniste des résultats mais les larges conseils d'administration ne sont pas efficaces dans l'augmentation de la fiabilité des états financiers.

Suggested Citation

  • Hamadi Matoussi & Imen Mahfoudh, 2006. "Composition du conseil d'administration et gestion opportuniste des résultats," Post-Print halshs-00548058, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00548058
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00548058
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