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Interdépendance des mécanismes de gouvernance : Etude empirique dans le contexte canadien

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Author Info

  • Paul André

    (HEC Montréal - HEC MONTRÉAL)

  • Hanen Khemakhem

    (Ecole des sciences de la gestion - Université du Québec à Montréal)

  • Ouafa Sakka

    (HEC Montréal - HEC MONTRÉAL)

Abstract

Le présent article traite de l'interdépendance entre trois mécanismes internes de contrôle des dirigeants, à savoir : la rémunération du dirigeant par des options, la propriété managériale et l'indépendance du conseil. Nous avons supposé que le recours de l'entreprise à l'un de ces mécanismes est fonction de l'utilisation des autres mécanismes. Pour tester cette hypothèse, nous avons utilisé un système d'équations simultanées solutionné moyennant la méthode du triple moindre carré. Nos résultats révèlent que les liens de causalité entre les trois mécanismes de gouvernance étudiés vont dans les deux sens suivants : de l'indépendance du conseil vers la rémunération du dirigeant par des options et de la rémunération du dirigeant par des options vers la propriété managériale dans le capital social. Ainsi, il n'existe pas de véritables liens réciproques entre les mécanismes d'intérêt. Plus particulièrement, l'indépendance du conseil ne semble par être déterminée par les deux autres mécanismes.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00548055.

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Date of creation: May 2006
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Publication status: Published - Presented, COMPTABILITE, CONTROLE, AUDIT ET INSTITUTION(S), 2006, Tunisia
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00548055

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Related research

Keywords: Théorie de l'agence; contrôle des dirigeants; interdépendance des mécanismes de gouvernance; conseil d'administration; propriété managériale; rémunération des dirigeants;

References

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  1. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 8-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  2. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1996. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(03), pages 377-397, September.
  3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  4. Chung, Kee H. & Pruitt, Stephen W., 1996. "Executive ownership, corporate value, and executive compensation: A unifying framework," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 1135-1159, August.
  5. Larcker, David F., 1983. "The association between performance plan adoption and corporate capital investment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-30, April.
  6. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-90, June.
  7. Jensen, Gerald R. & Solberg, Donald P. & Zorn, Thomas S., 1992. "Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership, Debt, and Dividend Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(02), pages 247-263, June.
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