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Determinants of insurance demand against forest fire risk: Evidence from experimental and real world data

Author

Listed:
  • Marielle Brunette

    (LEF - Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech)

  • Stéphane Couture

    (UBIA - Unité de Biométrie et Intelligence Artificielle (ancêtre de MIAT) - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Serge S. Garcia

    (LEF - Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech)

Abstract

This article estimates the demand for forest insurance of French private forest owners against fire risk. We combine experimental and real world data and use a Heckman selection model to separately analyse insurance participation and coverage-level decisions. Our results showthat some determinants explain either participation to insurance (e.g., ambiguity about the probability of occurrence of natural hazards) or coverage-level decision (e.g., the past perception of a public help in real life), some of them do not allow to explain the owner's insurance behaviour (e.g., having ever suffered from a fire in the past) while the other explain both the two behaviours (e.g., a contingent fixed help program).

Suggested Citation

  • Marielle Brunette & Stéphane Couture & Serge S. Garcia, 2011. "Determinants of insurance demand against forest fire risk: Evidence from experimental and real world data," Post-Print hal-01191123, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01191123
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01191123
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cipollaro, Maria & Sacchelli, Sandro, 2018. "Demand and potential subsidy level for forest insurance market in Demand and potential subsidy level for forest insurance market in Italy," 2018 Seventh AIEAA Conference, June 14-15, Conegliano, Italy 275647, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA).

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