IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00585953.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Leverage Choice and Credit Spreads when Managers Risk Shift

Author

Listed:
  • Ali Lazrak

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Murray Carlson

Abstract

We model the debt and asset risk choice of a manager with performance-insensitive pay (cash) and performance-sensitive pay (stock) to theoretically link compensation structure, leverage, and credit spreads. The model predicts that optimal leverage trades off the tax benefit of debt against the utility cost of ex-post asset substitution and that credit spreads are increasing in the ratio of cash-to-stock. Using a large cross-section of U.S.-based corporate credit default swaps (CDS) covering 2001 to 2006, we find a positive association between cash-to-stock and CDS rates, and between cash-to-stock and leverage ratios.

Suggested Citation

  • Ali Lazrak & Murray Carlson, 2010. "Leverage Choice and Credit Spreads when Managers Risk Shift," Post-Print hal-00585953, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00585953
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01617.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Strebulaev, Ilya A. & Whited, Toni M., 2012. "Dynamic Models and Structural Estimation in Corporate Finance," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 6(1–2), pages 1-163, November.
    2. Erwan Morellec & Boris Nikolov & Norman Schürhoff, 2012. "Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(3), pages 803-848, June.
    3. Colonnello, Stefano & Koetter, Michael & Wagner, Konstantin, 2020. "Effectiveness and (in)efficiencies of compensation regulation: Evidence from the EU banker bonus cap," IWH Discussion Papers 7/2018, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), revised 2020.
    4. Nguyen, Duc Nguyen & Nguyen, Canh Phuc & Dang, Le Phuong Xuan, 2022. "Uncertainty and corporate default risk: Novel evidence from emerging markets," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    5. Gan, Liu & Xia, Xin, 2019. "Idiosyncratic risk, managerial discretion and capital structure," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 586-599.
    6. Thomas Bauer & Thomas Kourouxous & Peter Krenn, 2018. "Taxation and agency conflicts between firm owners and managers: a review," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 11(1), pages 33-76, February.
    7. Liu, Jinyu & Zhong, Rui, 2017. "Political uncertainty and a firm's credit risk: Evidence from the international CDS market," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 53-66.
    8. Larry D. Wall, 2020. "Is stricter regulation of incentive compensation the missing piece?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(1), pages 82-94, March.
    9. Colonnello, Stefano & Curatola, Giuliano & Hoang, Ngoc Giang, 2017. "Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 428-466.
    10. Hsin-Hui Chiu & Eva Wagner, 2020. "CEO Bonus Pay and Firm Credit Risk," International Journal of Risk and Contingency Management (IJRCM), IGI Global, vol. 9(1), pages 1-19, January.
    11. Glover, Brent & Levine, Oliver, 2017. "Idiosyncratic risk and the manager," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(2), pages 320-341.
    12. Mateus Waga & Davi Valladão & Alexandre Street & Thuener Silva, 2022. "Disentangling Shareholder Risk Aversion from Leverage-Dependent Borrowing Cost on Corporate Policies," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 60(3), pages 1-24, October.
    13. Colonnello, Stefano, 2017. "Internal governance and creditor governance: Evidence from credit default swaps," IWH Discussion Papers 6/2017, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    14. Lu Tang & Shihan Zhang & Chenhui Ding & Jinyao Huan, 2022. "How Can the Sustainable Motivational Effect of Equity Incentives on Corporate Performance Be Exploited?—A Study Based on the Moderating Effect of Aspiration Level," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(24), pages 1-17, December.
    15. Yang, Shanxiang & Liu, Zhechen & Wang, Xinjie, 2020. "News sentiment, credit spreads, and information asymmetry," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    16. Feng, Cecilia (Qian) & Wang, Tawei, 2019. "Does CIO risk appetite matter? Evidence from information security breach incidents," International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 59-75.
    17. Erwan Morellec & Boris Nikolov & Norman Schürhoff, 2018. "Agency Conflicts around the World," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(11), pages 4232-4287.
    18. Switzer, Lorne N. & Tu, Qiao & Wang, Jun, 2018. "Corporate governance and default risk in financial firms over the post-financial crisis period: International evidence," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 196-210.
    19. He, Wei & Kyaw, NyoNyo A., 2018. "Capital structure adjustment behaviors of Chinese listed companies: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 14-22.
    20. Dezső, Cristian L. & Ross, David Gaddis, 2012. "Are banks happy when managers go long? The information content of managers’ vested option holdings for loan pricing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 395-410.
    21. Patricia Boyallian & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, 2018. "Leverage, CEO Risk-Taking Incentives, and Bank Failure during the 2007–10 Financial Crisis [Endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(5), pages 1763-1805.
    22. Michaël Dewally & Yingying Shao & Dan Singer, 2013. "The Liquidity Crisis: Evidence from the US Hospitality Industry," Tourism Economics, , vol. 19(3), pages 545-563, June.
    23. Jean Canil & Bruce Rosser, 2015. "Evidence on exercise pricing in CEO option grants in two countries," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 383-410, November.
    24. Todd Mitton, 2022. "Methodological Variation in Empirical Corporate Finance," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(2), pages 527-575.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00585953. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.