Impact of Genetic Testing on Surveillance and Prevention
AbstractThere is a prospect of substantial advancements in the understanding of the relationship between disease and genetics at least in the medium term to long term future. In this paper we consider the implications on two aspects of behaviour - surveillance to improve the chances of early detection of disease onset and preventive actions to reduce the probability of onset - that may change as a result of the acquisition of information from genetic tests. We argue that there are problems for both private insurance regimes, with risk-rating allowed according to genetic type, and public insurance regimes (or a private insurance system with an "effective" community rating regulation) in generating potential health benefits from increased genetic information. In the public regime appropriate signals to obtain genetic information are not always provided while in the private regime premium risk can block otherwise fruitful acquisitions of this information. In both regimes moral hazard considerations can blunt the adoption of otherwise useful information with the further problem for public insurance of possibly encouraging excessive adoption of genetic testing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 0904.
Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
value of information; surveillance; prevention.;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-11-21 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-REG-2009-11-21 (Regulation)
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- Bardey, David & De Donder, Philippe, 2012.
"Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
8977, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bardey, David & De Donder, Philippe, 2013. "Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 768-779.
- David Bardey & Philippe De Donder, 2011. "Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 009083, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
- Bardey, David & De Donder, Philippe, 2012. "Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard," IDEI Working Papers 729, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Bardey, David & De Donder, Philippe, 2012. "Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard," TSE Working Papers 12-320, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- David Bardey & Philippe De Donder, 2012. "Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 009798, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
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