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Corporate Takeovers in the Laboratory when Shareholders Own More than One Share

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Author Info

  • Cadsby, C.B.
  • Maynes, E.

Abstract

We study the tendering decisions of shareholders endowed with multiple shares to test game-theoretic models of the tendering process in the laboratory. An equilibrium outcome in which value-increasing takeovers always just succeed fails to emerge. Rather, tendered shares cycle around the equilibrium level with successful takeovers occuring more often toward the end of each game. Although game-theoretic results predict that neither bid level nor bid type should affect the number of shraes tendered nor the extent to which bids succeed, bith factors are found to be significant, albeit less so as each game draws to a close.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 1998-3.

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Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gue:guelph:1998-3

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Postal: Guelph, Ontario, N1G 2W1
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Web page: https://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/
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Related research

Keywords: TAKEOVERS ; GAME THEORY ; SHARES;

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Cited by:
  1. Ann B. Gillette & Thomas H. Noe, 2000. "If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers," Working Paper 2000-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  2. Burkart, Mike & Gromb, Denis & Panunzi, Fausto, 2005. "Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia," CEPR Discussion Papers 5240, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Bram Cadsby, C. & Maynes, Elizabeth, 2005. "Gender, risk aversion, and the drawing power of equilibrium in an experimental corporate takeover game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 39-59, January.
  4. Scott Barrett, 2007. "The Smallpox Eradication Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 179-207, January.

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