Corporate Takeovers in the Laboratory when Shareholders Own More than One Share
AbstractWe study the tendering decisions of shareholders endowed with multiple shares to test game-theoretic models of the tendering process in the laboratory. An equilibrium outcome in which value-increasing takeovers always just succeed fails to emerge. Rather, tendered shares cycle around the equilibrium level with successful takeovers occuring more often toward the end of each game. Although game-theoretic results predict that neither bid level nor bid type should affect the number of shraes tendered nor the extent to which bids succeed, bith factors are found to be significant, albeit less so as each game draws to a close.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 1998-3.
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
TAKEOVERS ; GAME THEORY ; SHARES;
Other versions of this item:
- Cadsby, C Bram & Maynes, Elizabeth, 1998. "Corporate Takeovers in the Laboratory When Shareholders Own More Than One Share," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71(4), pages 537-72, October.
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
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- Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 2006.
"Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(1), pages 32-49, March.
- Bram Cadsby, C. & Maynes, Elizabeth, 2005. "Gender, risk aversion, and the drawing power of equilibrium in an experimental corporate takeover game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 39-59, January.
- Ann B. Gillette & Thomas H. Noe, 2000. "If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers," Working Paper 2000-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Scott Barrett, 2007. "The Smallpox Eradication Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 179-207, January.
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