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The Smallpox Eradication Game

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Author Info
Scott Barrett ()
Abstract

Why did the world succeed in eradicating smallpox? Though eradication is a global public good, theory suggests that it should not have been vulnerable to free riding. Some countries, however, lacked the capacity to eliminate smallpox. Success thus depended on the other countries providing assistance. Theory suggests that this public good also should not have been vulnerable to free riding. However, financing proved challenging, even though the global benefit-cost ratio for eradication exceeded 400:1. Contrary to what theory suggests, what may have been the greatest achievement of international cooperation ever was not inevitable. Indeed, it very nearly failed. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-9079-z
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 130 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 179-207
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:130:y:2007:i:1:p:179-207

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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Related research
Keywords: Smallpox; Disease eradication; Global public good; International financing; International cooperation;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2002. "The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 215-233, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Cadsby, C.B. & Maynes, E., 1998. "Corporate Takeovers in the Laboratory when Shareholders Own More than One Share," Working Papers 1998-3, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  3. Putnam, Robert D, 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-60, Summer.
  4. Vesterlund, Lise, 2003. "The informational value of sequential fundraising," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 627-657, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Compte, Olivier & Jehiel, Philippe, 2003. "Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 334-342, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Scott Barrett, 2003. "Global Disease Eradication," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 591-600, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Oran R. Young, 2003. "Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 145-147, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Olmstead, Alan L. & Rhode, Paul W., 2004. "An Impossible Undertaking: The Eradication of Bovine Tuberculosis in the United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(03), pages 734-772, September. [Downloadable!]
  10. Todd Sandler, 2005. "Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 75-93, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Cadsby, Charles Bram & Maynes, Elizabeth, 1999. "Voluntary provision of threshold public goods with continuous contributions: experimental evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 53-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Barrett, Scott, 2001. "International cooperation for sale," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1835-1850, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Cadsby, C.B. & Maynes, E., 1998. "Corporate Takeovers in the Laboratory when Shareholders Own More than One Share," Working Papers 1998-3, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.
  14. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June. [Downloadable!]
  15. Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(2), pages 259-76, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Geoffard, Pierre-Yves & Philipson, Tomas, 1997. "Disease Eradication: Private versus Public Vaccination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 222-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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