Reinforcing the patent system? Patent fencing, knowledge diffusion and welfare
AbstractThis article develops an evolutionary model of industry dynamics in order to carry out a richer theoretical analysis of the consequences of a stronger patent system. This model explicitly takes into account the potentially positive effects of the patents: Publication of patents participates to the building of a collective knowledge stock on which the innovations can rely, and dropped patents can provide a source of technological progress for firms that are lagging behind the leaders of the industry. These dimensions of the patent system are used to question the negative results of Vallée & Yildizoglu (2006). The main results of the new model show that these positive effects do not counterbalance the negative effects of a stronger patent system on social welfare and global technological progress, even if it is a source of better protection and higher profits for the firms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Groupement de Recherches Economiques et Sociales in its series Cahiers du GRES with number 2006-23.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Innovation; Technical progress; Patent system; Intellectual property rights (IPR); Technology policy; Technological regimes;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-10-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-INO-2006-10-07 (Innovation)
- NEP-KNM-2006-10-07 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
- NEP-REG-2006-10-07 (Regulation)
- NEP-TID-2006-10-07 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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