This paper argues that interests of nationals and owners of home-based foreign capital in the formation of a Trade Agreements (TA) are not antagonistic, except under rather particular assumptions on initial tariffs among potential members. Further, if initial tariffs are endogenously determined through an industry-lobbying process, then TA that would have been immiserising in the absence of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), may be welfare-enhancing in the presence of foreign-owned firms. The rationale is linked to the effect that the entry of FDI has on the pre-TA tariff, through contributions to the incumbent government. These results may help explain recent integration programs between developed and developing countries.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics in its series Papers with number
97-003.
Length: 24 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:stante:97-003
Contact details of provider: Postal: STANFORD UNIVERSITY, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics,STANFORD CALIFORNIA 94305 U.S.A. Phone: (650) 723-2218 Fax: (650) 725-5702 Email: Web page: http://www.stanford.edu/group/SITE/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
Find related papers by JEL classification: F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business