L'impact de la negociation et des prises de controle sur l'ampleur de l'effet de Cliquet
AbstractThis paper considers a long-term relationship between a firm and a privately informed trading partner, say a buyer, when both parties bargain over a price in each period and when a toakeover may take place.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number 99-19.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.
STRUCTURES DES MARCHES ; INFORMATION ; FINANCEMENT DE L'ENTREPRISE;
Other versions of this item:
- G. Chemla, 1999. "L'impact de la négociation et des prises de contrôle sur l'ampleur de l 'effet de Cliquet," THEMA Working Papers 99-19, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nagarajan S., 1995. "On the Generic Efficiency of Takeovers under Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 522-556, April.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K & Tirole, Jean, 1987.
"Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 37-50, February.
- Tirole, Jean & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1987. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities," Scholarly Articles 3196301, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities," Levine's Working Paper Archive 229, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 221-47, April.
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