This paper considers a long-term relationship between a firm and a privately informed trading partner, say a buyer, when both parties bargain over a price in each period and when a toakeover may take place.
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Paper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number
99-19.
Length: 28 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-19
Contact details of provider: Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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