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L'impact de la negociation et des prises de controle sur l'ampleur de l'effet de Cliquet

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  • Chemla, G.

Abstract

This paper considers a long-term relationship between a firm and a privately informed trading partner, say a buyer, when both parties bargain over a price in each period and when a toakeover may take place.

Suggested Citation

  • Chemla, G., 1999. "L'impact de la negociation et des prises de controle sur l'ampleur de l'effet de Cliquet," Papers 99-19, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-19
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nagarajan S., 1995. "On the Generic Efficiency of Takeovers under Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 522-556, April.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(1), pages 37-50.
    3. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, 1988. "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 33-68, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(2), pages 221-247.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    STRUCTURES DES MARCHES ; INFORMATION ; FINANCEMENT DE L'ENTREPRISE;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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