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Corporate Financial Structure, Incentives and Optimal Contracting (Reprint 049) Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Franklin Allen
Andrew Winton
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The firm can be regarded as consisting of several groups of investors and managers whose interests are regulated by the contracts between them. This survey covers the literature that looks at the nature of optimal financial contracts in the face of various asymmetries of information, control and type. Five areas are considered: (i) costly state verification and agency; (ii) adverse selection; (iii) the allocation of control rights among investors and the design of ownership structure; (iv) the allocation of risk and (v) acquisition of information.
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Paper provided by Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research in its series Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers with number
15-94.
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Handle: RePEc:fth:pennfi:15-94Contact details of provider: Postal: 3254 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367 Phone: (215) 898-7616 Fax: (215) 573-8084 Email: Web page: http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~rlwctr/ More information through EDIRC
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