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Corporate Financial Structure, Incentives and Optimal Contracting (Reprint 049)

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  • Franklin Allen
  • Andrew Winton

Abstract

The firm can be regarded as consisting of several groups of investors and managers whose interests are regulated by the contracts between them. This survey covers the literature that looks at the nature of optimal financial contracts in the face of various asymmetries of information, control and type. Five areas are considered: (i) costly state verification and agency; (ii) adverse selection; (iii) the allocation of control rights among investors and the design of ownership structure; (iv) the allocation of risk and (v) acquisition of information.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research in its series Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers with number 15-94.

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Handle: RePEc:fth:pennfi:15-94

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Cited by:
  1. Bhagwan Chowdhry & Mark Grinblatt & David Levine, 2002. "Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 609-633, June.
  2. Kaplan, Steven N. & Strömberg, Per, 2003. "Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses," SIFR Research Report Series 14, Institute for Financial Research.
  3. Damodaran, Aswath & John, Kose & Liu, Crocker H., 2005. "What motivates managers?: Evidence from organizational form changes," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 1-26, December.
  4. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 2000. "Optimal financial contracts for large investors: the role of lender liability," Working Papers 00-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  5. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 1999. "Financial contracts and the legal treatment of informed investors," Working Papers 99-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  6. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2000. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," NBER Working Papers 7660, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Andrew Winton, 1996. "Monitored finance, liquidity, and institutional investment choice," Working Paper 9616, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  8. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M, 2003. "Credit Risk Analysis and Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Bhagwan Chowdhry & Mark Grinblatt & David K Levine, 2001. "Information Aggregation, Currency Swaps, and the Design of Derivative Securities," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2106, David K. Levine.
  10. Axelson, Ulf, 2005. "Security Design with Investor Private Information," SIFR Research Report Series 37, Institute for Financial Research.
  11. Vesa Kanniainen & Rune Stenbacka, 1997. "Project Monitoring and Banking Competition under Adverse Selection," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-23, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Oct 1998.

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