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Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps

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Author Info
Bhagwan Chowdhry
Mark Grinblatt
David Levine

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Abstract

A security design model shows that multinational firms needing to finance their operations should issue different securities to investors in different countries in order to aggregate their disparate information about domestic and foreign cash flows. However, if the firm becomes bankrupt, investors may face uncertain costs of reorganizing assets in a foreign country and thus may value foreign assets at their average value. This penalizes superior firms with low reorganization costs. Such firms minimize the adverse selection penalty by designing securities that allocate all the cash flow in bankruptcy to investors for which the adverse selection costs are the smallest given the exchange rate. We show that this sharing rule can be implemented with currency swaps because these instruments allow the priorities of claims in bankruptcy to switch depending on the exchange rate.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 110 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 609-633
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:3:p:609-633

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  1. Pesendorfer Wolfgang, 1995. "Financial Innovation in a General Equilibrium Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 79-116, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Diamond, Douglas W. & Verrecchia, Robert E., 1981. "Information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 221-235, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Madan, Dilip & Soubra, Badih, 1991. "Design and Marketing of Financial Products," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 361-84. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Radner, Roy, 1979. "Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 655-78, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Peter DeMarzo & Darrell Duffie, 1999. "A Liquidity-Based Model of Security Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 65-100, January.
  6. Cooper, Ian A & Mello, Antonio S, 1991. " The Default Risk of Swaps," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(2), pages 597-620, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Rahi, Rohit, 1996. "Adverse Selection and Security Design," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 287-300, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. José M. Marín & Rohit Rahi, 1996. "Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness," Economics Working Papers 145, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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  10. Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale, 1988. "Optimal Security Design," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(3), pages 229-263. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Ross, Stephen A, 1989. " Institutional Markets, Financial Marketing, and Financial Innovation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 541-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. " Security Design," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1349-78, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Kyle, Albert S, 1989. "Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(3), pages 317-55, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Hellwig, Martin F., 1980. "On the aggregation of information in competitive markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 477-498, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Litzenberger, Robert H, 1992. " Swaps: Plain and Fanciful," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 831-50, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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