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Inequality, Segregation, and Redistribution

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  • Bjorvatn, K.
  • Cappelen, A.W.

Abstract

In a model of endogenous choice of location and endogenous aversion against inequality, we demonstrate that large pre-tax difference in income may lead to a residential segregation of rich and poor. Such segregation may reduce the social attachment between the groups in society, and reduce the willingness of the rich to make transfers to the poor.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- in its series Papers with number 13/00.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:norgee:13/00

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Postal: NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HELLEVEIEN 30, 5035 BERGEN SANDVIKEN NORWAY.
Phone: 5595 9000
Fax: 5595 9100
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Web page: http://www.nhh.no/
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Keywords: DISTRIBUTION ; INCOME ; TAXES;

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References

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  1. Thomas Piketty, 1994. "Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics," Working papers 94-15, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Bassett, William F. & Burkett, John P. & Putterman, Louis, 1999. "Income distribution, government transfers, and the problem of unequal influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 207-228, June.
  3. Persson, Mats, 1995. " Why Are Taxes So High in Egalitarian Societies?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 569-80, December.
  4. Horstmann, Ignatius J & Scharf, Kimberley Ann, 1999. "The New Federalism: Distributional Conflict, Voluntarism and Segregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
  6. Roland Benabou, 2000. "Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 96-129, March.
  7. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December.
  8. Perotti, Roberto, 1996. " Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 149-87, June.
  9. W.Norton Grubb, 1982. "The Dynamic Implications of the Tiebout Model: the Changing Composition of Boston Communities, 1960-1970," Public Finance Review, , vol. 10(1), pages 17-38, January.
  10. Pauly, Mark V., 1973. "Income redistribution as a local public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 35-58, February.
  11. Sandmo, Agnar, 1976. "Optimal taxation : An introduction to the literature," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 37-54.
  12. Douglas Massey, 1996. "The age of extremes: Concentrated affluence and poverty in the twenty-first century," Demography, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 395-412, November.
  13. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Michele Giuseppe Giuranno, 2005. "Income Inequality and the Size of the Public Sector," Economics Discussion Papers 603, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  2. Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Cappelen, Alexander, 2004. "Globalisation, inequality and redistribution," Memorandum 16/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  3. Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Cappelen, Alexander W., 2004. "Globalisation, inequality and redistribution," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 33, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  4. Giuranno, Michele, 2008. "Regional income disparity and the size of the Public Sector," POLIS Working Papers 114, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  5. Lind, Jo Thori, 2003. "Fractionalization and the size of government," Memorandum 21/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  6. Francisco Martínez Mora, 2004. "The impact of fiscal decentralization on income segregation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/68, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  7. Schaeffer, Y. & Charlot, S., 2012. "Inequality aversion, income redistribution and economic geography," Working Papers 201204, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).

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