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Convergence to Rational Expectations in a Stationary Linear Game

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Author Info
Jordan, J.S.
Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Minnesota - Center for Economic Research in its series Papers with number 258.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:minner:258

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Related research
Keywords: statistical analysis ; game theory ; information ; economic equilibrium;

Statistics
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