Wealth Constraints, Lobbying and the Efficiency of Public Allocation
AbstractIn Esteban and Ray (1999) we formalize a model in which individuals lobby before the government in order to benefit from some productivity enhancing government action (infrastructure, direct subsidies, permissions, in short). The government honestly tries to allocate these permissions to the agents that will make the best use of them, as revealed by the intensity of their lobbying. If the marginal cost of resources varies with wealth, the amount of information transmitted through lobbying will depend on the degree of inequality. In this paper, we summarize the main approach and examine the special case of equal wealth.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza in its series Papers with number 42.
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza. Canton Grande, 9. 15003 La Coruña, Spain
GAME THEORY ; ECONOMIC MODELS ; LOBBYING;
Other versions of this item:
- Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 2000. "Wealth constraints, lobbying and the efficiency of public allocation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 694-705, May.
- O20 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Banerjee, A.V., 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," Working papers 97-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
- Kiminori Matsuyama, 1999.
"The Rise of Mass Consumption Societies,"
1289, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kiminori Matsuyama, 2000. "The Rise of Mass Consumption Societies," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 23, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Jeremy Greenwood & Boyan Jovanovic, 1989.
"Financial Development, Growth, and the Distribution of Income,"
NBER Working Papers
3189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Greenwood, Jeremy & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1990. "Financial Development, Growth, and the Distribution of Income," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 1076-1107, October.
- Greenwood, Jeremy & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1988. "Financial Development, Growth, And The Distribution Of Income," Working Papers 88-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Greenwood, J. & Jovanovic, B., 1988. "Financial Development, Growth, And The Distribution Of Income," RCER Working Papers 131, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Greenwood, J. & Jovanovic, B., 1990. "Financial Development, Growth, And The Distribution Of Income," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9002, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
- Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332, November.
- Loury, Glenn C, 1981. "Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 843-67, June.
- Piketty, Thomas, 1997. "The Dynamics of the Wealth Distribution and the Interest Rate with Credit Rationing," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(2), pages 173-89, April.
- Galor, Oded & Zeira, Joseph, 1988.
"Income Distribution and Macroeconomics,"
51644, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Sep 1989.
- Abhijit V. Banerjee & Andrew F. Newman, 1990.
"Occupational Choice and the Process of Development,"
911, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Banerjee, Abhijit V & Newman, Andrew F, 1993. "Occupational Choice and the Process of Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 274-98, April.
- Lee, Woojin & Roemer, John E, 1998. " Income Distribution, Redistributive Politics, and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 217-40, September.
- Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1992. "Distribution and growth in models of imperfect capital markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 603-611, April.
- Ljungqvist, Lars, 1993. "Economic underdevelopment : The case of a missing market for human capital," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 219-239, April.
- Ray, Debraj & Streufert, Peter A, 1993. "Dynamic Equilibria with Unemployment Due to Undernourishment," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 61-85, January.
- Shun-ichiro Bessho & Kimiko Terai, 2008.
"Competition for Private Capital and Central Grants: The Case of Japanese Industrial Parks,"
080909, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Shun-ichiro Bessho & Kimiko Terai, 2011. "Competition for private capital and central grants: the case of Japanese industrial parks," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 135-154, June.
- Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2006. "Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 257-279, March.
- Teng Wang, 2011. "Lobbying paradox of strategic export policy in a differentiated duopoly," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 323-336, September.
- Ghatak, Maitreesh & Morelli, Massimo & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2007. "Entrepreneurial talent, occupational choice, and trickle up policies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 27-48, November.
- Campante, Felipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco G.H., 2004.
"Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3240, The World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.