"Wages and the Intensity of Labor Effort: Efficiency Wages Versus Compensating Payments"
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The A. Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management. University of California Riverside in its series The A. Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management with number 92-43.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: The A. Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management. University of California, Riverside. Riverside CA 92521
Web page: http://www.agsm.ucr.edu/
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wages ; labour market;
Other versions of this item:
- Fairris, D. & Alston, L.J., 1990. "Wages And The Intensity Of Labor Effort: Efficiency Wages Versus Compensating Payments," Department of Economics Working Papers 138, Department of Economics, Williams College.
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- David Aadland & Sherrill Shaffer, 2012.
CAMA Working Papers
2012-28, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- David Fairris, 2004. "Towards a Theory of Work Intensity," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 30(4), pages 587-601, Fall.
- Green, Francis & McIntosh, Steven, 2001. "The intensification of work in Europe," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 291-308, May.
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