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Bargaining, Efficiency and the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemna

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Author Info
Chakravorti, B.
Conley, J.P.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bell Communications - Economic Research Group in its series Papers with number 91.

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Length: 4 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bellco:91

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Postal: Bell Communications Research; Economic Research Group, 445 South street Morristown, NJ 07962-1910, USA

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Related research
Keywords: game theory;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey," Discussion Papers 1197, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bhaskar Chakravorti & Bart Taub & John P. Conley, 2002. "Probabilistic cheap talk," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 281-294. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-24.

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