The formulation of monetary policy
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to elucidate the way in which current institutional arrangements shape the character of monetary policy. It is emphasized that the Fed, in order to preserve its independence, formulates monetary policy in a way that prevents the formation of coalitions within the government that could threaten its independence. As a consequence, the Fed, in general, attempts to balance multiple, changing objectives. This attempt leads to the demand for "flexibility," an absence of precommitment. Much of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the way in which the Fed's desire to avoid precommitment influences its use of analytical procedures for formulating policy and its use of money supply targets.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its series Working Paper with number 84-02.
Date of creation: 1984
Date of revision:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mayer, Thomas, 1982. "A case study of Federal Reserve policymaking : Regulation Q in 1966," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 259-271.
- Lombra, Raymond & Moran, Michael, 1980. "Policy advice and policymaking at the federal reserve," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 9-68, January.
- Michael Dotsey, 1985. "Monetary policy, secrecy, and federal funds rate behavior," Working Paper 85-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Robert L. Hetzel, 1984. "Monetary policy in the early 1980's," Working Paper 84-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Robert J. Barro, 1986. "Rules versus Discretion," NBER Working Papers 1473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (William Perkins).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.