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The poor, the rich and the enforcer: institutional choice and growth

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Author Info
Erwan Quintin
Thorsten Koeppl
Cyril Monnet

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Abstract

We study economies where improving the quality of institutions – modeled as improving contract enforcement – requires resources, but enables trade that raises output by reducing the dispersion of marginal products of capital. We find that in this type of environment it is optimal to combine institutional building with endowment redistribution, and that more ex-ante dispersion in marginal products increases the incentives to invest in enforcement. In addition, we show that institutional investments lead over time to a progressive reduction in inequality. Finally, the framework we describe enables us to formalize the hypothesis formulated by Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) that the initial concentration of human and physical capital can explain the divergence of different countries’ institutional history.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in its series Working Papers with number 0801.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:fip:feddwp:0801

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Keywords: Human capital Macroeconomics

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  1. Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 949-995, October.
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  2. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1997. "A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(2), pages 151-72, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 271-303, 09. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Banerjee, Abhijit V & Duflo, Esther, 2003. " Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 267-99, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 600-621, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2005. "Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1587-1621, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Koeppl, Thorsten V., 2007. "Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 34-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Lloyd-Ellis, Huw & Bernhardt, Dan, 2000. "Enterprise, Inequality and Economic Development," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(1), pages 147-68, January.
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  10. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Banerjee, Abhijit V & Newman, Andrew F, 1993. "Occupational Choice and the Process of Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 274-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Benabou, R., 1996. "Inequality and Growth," Working Papers 96-22, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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