The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network
AbstractImperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough. All equilibria under exogenously imposed truth-telling extend to strategic communication, and additional ones arise due to richer communication. There are equilibria in which a player lies. The flow of information is related with network centrality measures.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2010.120.
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Repeated Game; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Imperfect Private Monitoring; Network; Strategic Communication; Centrality;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-11-06 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EVO-2010-11-06 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-11-06 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-11-06 (Game Theory)
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- Markus Kinateder, 2013.
"Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 283-294, February.
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