IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ewp/wpaper/437web.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

School choice with farsighted students

Author

Listed:
  • Ata Atay

    (University of Barcelona and BEAT)

  • Ana Mauleon

    (CEREC and CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain)

  • Vincent Vannetelbosch

    (CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain)

Abstract

We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC.

Suggested Citation

  • Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2022. "School choice with farsighted students," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/437, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ewp:wpaper:437web
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/191605
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2017. "Rational expectations and farsighted stability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
    2. Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2017. "Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 14-19.
    3. Jean-Jacques HERINGS & Ana MAULEON & Vincent VANNETELBOSCH, 2017. "Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty path dominance," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2861, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ata Atay & Sylvain Funck & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023. "Matching markets with farsighted couples," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2023/445, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2022. "Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching," Papers 2212.07427, arXiv.org.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Atay, Ata & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2022. "Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2022028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2020. "Matching with myopic and farsighted players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    3. Mauleon, Ana & Sempere-Monerris, Jose J. & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2023. "R&D network formation with myopic and farsighted firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 208(C), pages 203-229.
    4. Pierre de Callataÿ & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023. "Myopic-farsighted absorbing networks," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 405-422, April.
    5. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, V., 2020. "Do Stable Outcomes Survive in Marriage Problems with Myopic and Farsighted Players?," Research Memorandum 031, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    6. Luo, Chenghong & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2022. "Friendship networks with farsighted agents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2022021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Mauleon, Ana & Roehl, Nils & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2019. "Paths to stability for overlapping group structures," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 19-24.
    8. Demuynck, Thomas & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo & Seel, Christian, 2018. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments (RM/17/002-revised)," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    9. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Kóczy, László Á., 2021. "The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 67-79.
    10. Núñez, Marina & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2022. "Stable cores in information graph games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 353-367.
    11. Atay, Ata & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2021. "A bargaining set for roommate problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    12. Troyan, Peter & Delacrétaz, David & Kloosterman, Andrew, 2020. "Essentially stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 370-390.
    13. Ata Atay & Sylvain Funck & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023. "Matching markets with farsighted couples," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2023/445, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    14. Vicki Knoblauch, 2020. "Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 369-381, October.
    15. Okada, Akira, 2021. "Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 193-201.
    16. Hirai, Toshiyuki & Watanabe, Naoki, 2018. "von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: The existence proof," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-12.
    17. Bando, Keisuke & Kawasaki, Ryo, 2021. "Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 211-223.
    18. Can, Burak & Pourpouneh, Mohsen & Storcken, Ton, 2017. "Cost of transformation: a measure on matchings," Research Memorandum 015, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    19. Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2023. "When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1145-1173, November.
    20. Bloch, Francis & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2020. "Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 32-54.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    School choice; top trading cycle; stable sets; farsighted students.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ewp:wpaper:437web. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: University of Barcelona School of Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feubaes.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.