IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/115294.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Chinese or western finance? Transparency, official credit flows, and the international political economy of development

Author

Listed:
  • Cormier, Benjamin

Abstract

Why do some developing countries obtain more official finance from China vis-a-vis Western sources? This study finds borrower transparency significantly affects which governments borrow more from China. From a supply side perspective, Chinese lending agencies have incentives to lend more to untransparent borrowers. From a demand side perspective, untransparent borrowers have incentives to use Chinese finance to avoid Western pressure to become more transparent. These findings and explanations have three implications. First, they help explain variation in external debt composition across developing countries using official credit. Second, they have implications for the international political economy of developing countries’ financial ties to China. Third, they imply the use of Chinese finance may allow untransparent governments to remain so, an important implication for the political economy of development.

Suggested Citation

  • Cormier, Benjamin, 2023. "Chinese or western finance? Transparency, official credit flows, and the international political economy of development," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115294, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:115294
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/115294/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James R. Hollyer & B. Peter Rosendorff & James Raymond Vreeland, 2019. "Why Do Autocrats Disclose? Economic Transparency and Inter-elite Politics in the Shadow of Mass Unrest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(6), pages 1488-1516, July.
    2. Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 2006. "World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 224-240, May.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
    4. Paul Clist & Alessia Isopi & Oliver Morrissey, 2012. "Selectivity on aid modality: Determinants of budget support from multilateral donors," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 267-284, September.
    5. Humphrey, Chris & Michaelowa, Katharina, 2019. "China in Africa: Competition for traditional development finance institutions?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 15-28.
    6. Isaksson, Ann-Sofie & Kotsadam, Andreas, 2018. "Racing to the bottom? Chinese development projects and trade union involvement in Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 284-298.
    7. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith & Randolph M. Siverson & James D. Morrow, 2005. "The Logic of Political Survival," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262524406, December.
    8. Dreher, Axel & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Thiele, Rainer, 2011. "Are ‘New’ Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between nonDAC and DAC Donor Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(11), pages 1950-1968.
    9. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2015. "Politics and IMF Conditionality," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 59(1), pages 120-148, February.
    10. Gehring, Kai & Michaelowa, Katharina & Dreher, Axel & Spörri, Franziska, 2017. "Aid Fragmentation and Effectiveness: What Do We Really Know?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 320-334.
    11. Isaksson, Ann-Sofie & Kotsadam, Andreas, 2018. "Chinese aid and local corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 146-159.
    12. Alexander E. Kentikelenis & Thomas H. Stubbs & Lawrence P. King, 2016. "IMF conditionality and development policy space, 1985–2014," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 543-582, July.
    13. Hernandez, Diego, 2017. "Are “New” Donors Challenging World Bank Conditionality?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 529-549.
    14. William Easterly, 2007. "Are aid agencies improving? [‘Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 22(52), pages 634-678.
    15. Humphrey, Chris & Michaelowa, Katharina, 2013. "Shopping for Development: Multilateral Lending, Shareholder Composition and Borrower Preferences," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 142-155.
    16. Clist, Paul, 2011. "25Years of Aid Allocation Practice: Whither Selectivity?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(10), pages 1724-1734.
    17. Mona Lyne & Daniel Nielson & Michael Tierney, 2009. "Controlling coalitions: Social lending at the multilateral development banks," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 407-433, December.
    18. Broich, Tobias, 2017. "Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 180-207.
    19. Andreas Dür & Leonardo Baccini & Manfred Elsig, 2014. "The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 353-375, September.
    20. Papke, Leslie E. & Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 2008. "Panel data methods for fractional response variables with an application to test pass rates," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1-2), pages 121-133, July.
    21. Bobonis, Gustavo J. & Gertler, Paul J. & Gonzalez-Navarro, Marco & Nichter, Simeon, 2019. "Government transparency and political clientelism: Evidence from randomized anti-corruption audits in Brazil," Research Department working papers 1463, CAF Development Bank Of Latinamerica.
    22. William Greene, 2004. "Fixed Effects and Bias Due to the Incidental Parameters Problem in the Tobit Model," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 125-147.
    23. Dür, Andreas & Baccini, Leonardo & Elsig, Manfred, 2014. "The design of international trade agreements: introducing a new dataset," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 59179, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    24. Kolstad, Ivar & Wiig, Arne, 2009. "Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 521-532, March.
    25. Broich, Tobias, 2017. "Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa," MERIT Working Papers 2017-011, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    26. Kilby, Christopher, 2009. "The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 51-61, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ben Cormier, 2023. "Chinese or western finance? Transparency, official credit flows, and the international political economy of development," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 297-328, April.
    2. Dreher, Axel & Fuchs, Andreas & Hodler, Roland & Parks, Bradley C. & Raschky, Paul A. & Tierney, Michael J., 2019. "African leaders and the geography of China's foreign assistance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 44-71.
    3. Emmanuelle Auriol & Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2019. "Taxing fragmented aid to improve aid efficiency," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 453-477, September.
    4. Marson, Marta & Savin, Ivan, 2022. "Complementary or adverse? Comparing development results of official funding from China and traditional donors in Africa," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 189-206.
    5. Angelika J. Budjan & Andreas Fuchs, 2021. "Democracy and Aid Donorship," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 217-238, November.
    6. Hoeffler, Anke & Sterck, Olivier, 2022. "Is Chinese aid different?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    7. Cormier, Ben, 2022. "Partisan external borrowing in middle-income countries," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 113929, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Ben Cormier & Mark S. Manger, 2022. "Power, ideas, and World Bank conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 397-425, July.
    9. Humphrey, Chris & Michaelowa, Katharina, 2019. "China in Africa: Competition for traditional development finance institutions?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 15-28.
    10. Eunhye Yoo, 2021. "Chinese Development Finance and its determinants: Does global governance matter?," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 39(3), pages 471-492, May.
    11. Mohamed Boly, 2021. "On the allocation of environmental aid : strategy beyond environmental considerations?," CERDI Working papers hal-03174770, HAL.
    12. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Yuanxin Li & Samuel Brazys & Alexander Dukalskis, 2019. "Building Bridges or Breaking Bonds? The Belt and Road Initiative and Foreign Aid Competition," Working Papers 201906, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.
    13. Liya Palagashvili & Claudia R. Williamson, 2021. "Grading foreign aid agencies: Best practices across traditional and emerging donors," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 654-676, May.
    14. Richard Bluhm & Axel Dreher & Andreas Fuchs & Bradley C. Parks & Austin M. Strange & Michael J. Tierney, 2020. "Connective Financing - Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic Activity in Developing Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 8344, CESifo.
    15. Dreher, Axel & Gehring, Kai & Klasen, Stephan, 2015. "Gesture Politics or Real Commitment? Gender Inequality and the Allocation of Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 464-480.
    16. Nagae, Akira & Katayama, Hajime & Takase, Koichi, 2022. "Donor aid allocation and accounting standards of recipients," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    17. Lauren L. Ferry & Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Christina J. Schneider, 2020. "Catch me if you care: International development organizations and national corruption," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 767-792, October.
    18. Mitchell Watkins, 2022. "Undermining conditionality? The effect of Chinese development assistance on compliance with World Bank project agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 667-690, October.
    19. Axel Dreher & Stephan Klasen & James Raymond Vreeland & Eric Werker, 2013. "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(1), pages 157-191.
    20. Cruzatti C., John & Dreher, Axel & Matzat, Johannes, 2023. "Chinese aid and health at the country and local level," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    China; transparency; official finance; aid; international political economy; development; Springer deal;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:115294. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.