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Government transparency and political clientelism: Evidence from randomized anti-corruption audits in Brazil

Author

Listed:
  • Bobonis, Gustavo J.
  • Gertler, Paul J.
  • Gonzalez-Navarro, Marco
  • Nichter, Simeon

Abstract

Political clientelism is considered a fundamental reason why politicians are not accountable and responsive to their constituencies. In this working paper, we study whether transparency initiatives – more specifically, top-down anti-corruption audits – can reduce the incidence of vote-buying and political clientelism in the context of Brazil’s municipal government anti-corruption program. This program selected municipalities at random to audit municipal finances, which allows for causal inference. We combine the audit program data for a sample of municipalities in the country’s Northeast region with a dedicated longitudinal survey we conducted in 2011-2013 of a large representative sample of impoverished rural households. This enables us to estimate short and long-term effects of the government anti corruption audits on subsequent levels of vote-buying and political clientelism.

Suggested Citation

  • Bobonis, Gustavo J. & Gertler, Paul J. & Gonzalez-Navarro, Marco & Nichter, Simeon, 2019. "Government transparency and political clientelism: Evidence from randomized anti-corruption audits in Brazil," Research Department working papers 1463, CAF Development Bank Of Latinamerica.
    • Handle: RePEc:dbl:dblwop:1463
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    File URL: https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1463
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ben Cormier, 2023. "Chinese or western finance? Transparency, official credit flows, and the international political economy of development," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 297-328, April.
    2. Maximiliano Lauletta & Martín A. Rossi & Christian A. Ruzzier, 2022. "Audits and Government Hiring Practices," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(353), pages 214-227, January.
    3. Maximiliano Lauletta & Martín A. Rossi & Christian A. Ruzzier, 2020. "Audits and the Quality of Government," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4404, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    4. Cormier, Benjamin, 2023. "Chinese or western finance? Transparency, official credit flows, and the international political economy of development," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115294, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corrupción; Democracia; Fortalecimiento institucional; Gobernabilidad; Investigación socioeconómica; Sector público;
    All these keywords.

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