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Tax Interdependence in American States

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  • Claudio Agostini

Abstract

State governments finance their expenditures with multiple tax instruments, so when collections from one source decline, they are typically compensated by greater revenues from other sources. This paper addresses the important question of the extent to which personal and corporate income taxes are used to compensate for sales tax fluctuations within the U.S. states. The results show that one percent increase in the sales tax rate is associated with a half and a third percent decrease in the personal and corporate income tax rates respectively. In terms of tax revenues per capita, the results show that a one percent increase in the sales tax revenue per capita is associated with a 3 percent and a 0.9 percent decrease in the corporate and personal income tax revenue per capita respectively. On average then, an exogenous reduction of $4.5 in the sales tax revenue per capita is compensated, ceteris paribus, with an increase of either $3.4 in the collections per capita from corporate taxes or $3.6 in the ones from personal income taxes

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  • Claudio Agostini, 2004. "Tax Interdependence in American States," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 155, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:latm04:155
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax mix; state taxes; instrumental variables;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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