IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecb/ecbops/2021262.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The IMF’s role in sovereign debt restructurings

Author

Listed:
  • Committeri, Marco
  • Alves, Inês
  • Arthur, Julien
  • De Marchi, Raffaele
  • Essers, Dennis
  • Keeney, Mary
  • Kosterink, Patrick
  • Lieber, Alexander
  • Martinez-Resano, José Ramon
  • Osińska, Joanna
  • Spadafora, Francesco
  • Vasil, Roman
  • Vonessen, Benjamin

Abstract

The global recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting deterioration in many countries’ public finances have increased the risk of sovereign debt crises. Although crisis prevention remains paramount, these developments have made it imperative to re-examine the adequacy of the current toolkit for crisis management and resolution, in a context where changes in the creditor base and in the composition of public debt instruments have brought about new challenges in terms of reduced transparency and additional barriers to achieving inter-creditor equity. This report focuses on the international architecture for sovereign debt restructurings (SODRs), as seen through the lenses of the International Monetary Fund (IMF or “the Fund”) and with a special attention to the role that the Fund can play in facilitating orderly restructuring processes. It provides a set of findings and recommendations in relation to certain key elements of the Fund’s lending framework that have important ramifications on SODR processes, namely debt sustainability assessments (DSAs), the exceptional access policy (EAP) for financing above normal access limits, and the criteria for lending to countries with payments arrears to private creditors (LIA) or official bilateral creditors (LIOA). It also considers other indirect channels through which the Fund can affect SODRs, including its support for enhancing the transparency and public disclosure of sovereign debt information, its collaboration with the Paris Club and the G20 debt-related initiatives, the promotion of contractual standards for sovereign debt, and the monitoring of relevant legislative developments. JEL Classification: F34, F55, H63

Suggested Citation

  • Committeri, Marco & Alves, Inês & Arthur, Julien & De Marchi, Raffaele & Essers, Dennis & Keeney, Mary & Kosterink, Patrick & Lieber, Alexander & Martinez-Resano, José Ramon & Osińska, Joanna & Spadaf, 2021. "The IMF’s role in sovereign debt restructurings," Occasional Paper Series 262, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbops:2021262
    Note: 2648491
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op262~f0e9e1e77e.en.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benjamin Hébert & Jesse Schreger, 2017. "The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from Argentina," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(10), pages 3119-3145, October.
    2. Kay Chung & Michael G. Papaioannou, 2021. "Do Enhanced Collective Action Clauses Affect Sovereign Borrowing Costs?," Journal of Banking and Financial Economics, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 1(15), pages 59-87, October.
    3. Elena Carletti & Paolo Colla & Mitu Gulati & Steven Ongena, 2021. "The Price of Law: The Case of the Eurozone Collective Action Clauses [Unbundling institutions]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(12), pages 5933-5976.
    4. Lee C Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, 2020. "The Argentine collective action clause controversy," Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(4), pages 464-473.
    5. Marco Committeri & Francesco Spadafora, 2013. "You never give me your money? Sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 143, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    6. Javier Díaz-Cassou & Aitor Erce-Domínguez & Juan J. Vázquez-Zamora, 2008. "The role of the IMF in recent sovereign debt restructurings: Implications for the policy of lending into arrears," Occasional Papers 0805, Banco de España.
    7. Christoph Grosse Steffen & Sebastian Grund & Julian Schumacher, 2019. "Collective action clauses in the euro area: a law and economic analysis of the first five years," Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 134-154.
    8. Ian Clark & Dimitrios Lyratzakis, 2021. "Towards a more robust sovereign debt restructuring architecture: innovations from Ecuador and Argentina," Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 31-44.
    9. Sean Hagan, 2020. "Sovereign debt restructuring: The centrality of the IMF's role," Working Paper Series WP20-13, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    10. repec:bdi:opques:qef_143_01 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chuck Fang & Julian Schumacher & Christoph Trebesch, 2021. "Restructuring Sovereign Bonds: Holdouts, Haircuts and the Effectiveness of CACs," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 69(1), pages 155-196, March.
    2. Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph & Enderlein, Henrik, 2021. "Sovereign defaults in court," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    3. Nicoletta Layher & Eyden Samunderu, 2020. "The Impact of the Introduction of Uniform European Collective Action Clauses on European Government Bonds as a Regulatory Result of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-32, December.
    4. Patrick Bolton & Mitu Gulati & Ugo Panizza, 2022. "Sovereign Debt Puzzles," IHEID Working Papers 27-2022, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    5. Latinovic, Zoran & Chatterjee, Sharmila C., 2022. "Achieving the promise of AI and ML in delivering economic and relational customer value in B2B," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 966-974.
    6. Chamon, Marcos & Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph, 2018. "Foreign-Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 114, pages 164-179.
    7. Cristina Arellano & Yan Bai & Luigi Bocola, 2017. "Sovereign Default Risk and Firm Heterogeneity," NBER Working Papers 23314, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Broner, Fernando & Martin, Alberto & Pandolfi, Lorenzo & Williams, Tomas, 2021. "Winners and losers from sovereign debt inflows," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    9. Grey Gordon & Pablo Guerron-Quintana, 2019. "A Quantitative Theory of Hard and Soft Sovereign Defaults," 2019 Meeting Papers 412, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Jean Pisani-Ferry & André Sapir & Guntram B. Wolff, . "EU-IMF assistance to euro area countries- an early assessment," Blueprints, Bruegel, number 779, December.
    11. Josefin Meyer & Carmen M Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2022. "Sovereign Bonds Since Waterloo," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(3), pages 1615-1680.
    12. Pablo Ottonello & Wenting Song, 2022. "Financial Intermediaries and the Macroeconomy: Evidence from a High-Frequency Identification," Staff Working Papers 22-24, Bank of Canada.
    13. Darmouni, Olivier & Papoutsi, Melina, 2022. "The rise of bond financing in Europe: five facts about new and small issuers," Working Paper Series 2663, European Central Bank.
    14. Trebesch, Christoph & Zabel, Michael, 2017. "The output costs of hard and soft sovereign default," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 416-432.
    15. Gong Cheng & Javier Diaz-Cassou & Aitor Erce, 2017. "From Debt Collection to Relief Provision: 60 Years of Official Debt Restructurings through the Paris Club," Working Papers 20, European Stability Mechanism.
    16. Leonardo Martinez & Francisco Roch & Francisco Roldán & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2023. "Sovereign debt," Chapters, in: Refet S. Gürkaynak & Jonathan H. Wright (ed.), Research Handbook of Financial Markets, chapter 17, pages 378-405, Edward Elgar Publishing.
      • Leonardo Martinez & Francisco Roch & Francisco Roldan & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2022. "Sovereign Debt," Working Papers 167, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
      • Mr. Leonardo Martinez & Mr. Francisco Roch & Francisco Roldán & Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2022. "Sovereign Debt," IMF Working Papers 2022/122, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Lorenzo Pandolfi & Tomas Williams, 2019. "Winners and losers from Sovereign debt inflows: evidence from the stock market," Economics Working Papers 1693, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    18. Pablo Moreno, 2013. "The Metamorphosis of the IMF (2009-2011)," Estudios Económicos, Banco de España, number 78.
    19. Bocola, Luigi & Bornstein, Gideon & Dovis, Alessandro, 2019. "Quantitative sovereign default models and the European debt crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 20-30.
    20. Ari, Anil, 2018. "Gambling traps," Working Paper Series 2217, European Central Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    debt restructuring regime; International Monetary Fund; sovereign debt; sovereign default;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbops:2021262. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Official Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/emieude.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.