Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Free cash flow, gouvernance et politique financière des entreprises françaises

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mehdi Nekhili

    ()
    (Université de Reims Champagne Ardenne & Groupe ESC Troyes)

  • Afifa Wali Siala

    (Université de Sfax (Tunisie))

  • Dhikra Chebbi

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

(VF)La limitation du problème du free cash flow dépend de l’efficacité des mécanismes de gouvernance. Dans notre étude, nous supposons que les mécanismes de gouvernance peuvent agir directement sur le niveau du free cash flow ou indirectement à travers les politiques d’endettement et de distribution de dividendes. Sur la base d’un échantillon de 123 entreprises françaises en 2004, les résultats montrent que c’est la distribution soutenue des dividendes, et non le niveau d’endettement, qui permet de réduire le niveau du free cash flow. Les caractéristiques du conseil d’administration et de la structure de propriété agissent directement sur le niveau du free cash flow plutôt qu’indirectement à travers la politique de distribution des dividendes.(VA)The limitation of the problem of free cash flow depends on the efficiency of governance mechanisms. In our study, we supposed that governance mechanisms can influence the level of free cash flow either directly or indirectly through debt and dividend distribution policies. On the basis of a sample of 123 French firms in 2004, the results show that it is sustained distribution of dividends – rather than debt level – that leads to reduction of free cash flow. Characteristics of boards and ownership structure have a direct impact on free cash flow levels, and have a greater impact on them than indirectly through dividend policy.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://leg.u-bourgogne.fr/images/stories/wp/1090102.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 500 Internal Server Error. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Angèle RENAUD)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 1090102.

as in new window
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie 2009, vol.12, n°1
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1090102

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

Order Information:
Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
Email:

Related research

Keywords: free cash flow; politique d’endettement; politique de distribution de dividendes; conseil d’administration; structure de propriété; Free cash flow; debt policy; dividend policy; board of directors; ownership structure.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Berger, Philip G & Ofek, Eli & Yermack, David L, 1997. " Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1411-38, September.
  2. Miller, Merton H & Rock, Kevin, 1985. " Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1031-51, September.
  3. Alexandre, Hervé & Paquerot, Mathieu, 2000. "Efficacité des structures de contrôle et enracinement des dirigeants," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6186, Paris Dauphine University.
  4. Abe De Jong & Ronald Van Dijk, 2007. "Determinants of Leverage and Agency Problems: A Regression Approach with Survey Data," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(6), pages 565-593.
  5. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1996. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(03), pages 377-397, September.
  6. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1995. "Equity ownership and the two faces of debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 131-157, September.
  7. Mara Faccio & A. Meziane Lasfer, 2001. "Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance: The Case of UK Pension Funds," CeRP Working Papers 11, Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies, Turin (Italy).
  8. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 8-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  9. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 08-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  10. Esther B. Del Brio & Javier Perote & Julio Pindado, 2003. "Measuring the Impact of Corporate Investment Announcements on Share Prices: The Spanish Experience," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(5-6), pages 715-747.
  11. Evelyne Poincelot, 1999. "Le rôle de l'endettement dans le contrôle du comportement managérial:le cas des firmes dégageant du free cash-flow," Working Papers CREGO 0990301, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  12. Julio Pindado & Chabela De La Torre, 2011. "Capital Structure: New Evidence from the Ownership Structure," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 11(2), pages 213-226, 06.
  13. Klaus Gugler, 2003. "Corporate governance and investment," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 261-289.
  14. de Miguel, Alberto & Pindado, Julio, 2001. "Determinants of capital structure: new evidence from Spanish panel data," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 77-99, March.
  15. Lehn, Kenneth & Poulsen, Annette, 1989. " Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 771-87, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Patrice Charlier & Céline Duboys, 2011. "Gouvernance familiale et politique de distribution aux actionnaires," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 14(1), pages 5-31., March.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1090102. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Angèle RENAUD).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.