Mehdi Nekhili () (Université de Reims Champagne Ardenne & Groupe ESC Troyes) Afifa Wali Siala (Université de Sfax (Tunisie)) Dhikra Chebbi (Université de Bourgogne)
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(VF)La limitation du problème du free cash flow dépend de l’efficacité des mécanismes de gouvernance. Dans notre étude, nous supposons que les mécanismes de gouvernance peuvent agir directement sur le niveau du free cash flow ou indirectement à travers les politiques d’endettement et de distribution de dividendes. Sur la base d’un échantillon de 123 entreprises françaises en 2004, les résultats montrent que c’est la distribution soutenue des dividendes, et non le niveau d’endettement, qui permet de réduire le niveau du free cash flow. Les caractéristiques du conseil d’administration et de la structure de propriété agissent directement sur le niveau du free cash flow plutôt qu’indirectement à travers la politique de distribution des dividendes.(VA)The limitation of the problem of free cash flow depends on the efficiency of governance mechanisms. In our study, we supposed that governance mechanisms can influence the level of free cash flow either directly or indirectly through debt and dividend distribution policies. On the basis of a sample of 123 French firms in 2004, the results show that it is sustained distribution of dividends – rather than debt level – that leads to reduction of free cash flow. Characteristics of boards and ownership structure have a direct impact on free cash flow levels, and have a greater impact on them than indirectly through dividend policy.
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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number
1090102.
Length: 30 pages Date of creation: Jan 2009 Date of revision: Publication status: published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie 2009, vol.12, n°1 Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1090102
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