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A value for cooperative games with a coalition structure

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  • Emilio Calvo

    ()
    (ERI-CES)

  • Esther Gutierrez

    ()
    (University Pais Vasco)

Abstract

A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding the cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value [Shapley, 1953] is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs of the coalitions, and the Solidarity value [Nowak and Radzik, 1994] to obtain the payoffs of the players inside each coalition.

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File URL: http://www.uv.es/erices/RePEc/WP/2011/0311.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Valencia, ERI-CES in its series Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour with number 0311.

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Date of creation: Feb 2011
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Handle: RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0311

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Related research

Keywords: Coalitional value; Shapley value; Owen value; Solidarity value;

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Cited by:
  1. Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel & Hellman, Ziv & Winter, Eyal, 2013. "Spectrum value for coalitional games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 132-142.

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