A value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
AbstractA value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding the cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value [Shapley, 1953] is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs of the coalitions, and the Solidarity value [Nowak and Radzik, 1994] to obtain the payoffs of the players inside each coalition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Valencia, ERI-CES in its series Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour with number 0311.
Date of creation: Feb 2011
Date of revision:
Coalitional value; Shapley value; Owen value; Solidarity value;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-02-19 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CIS-2011-02-19 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-GTH-2011-02-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2011-02-19 (Network Economics)
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- Mikel Alvarez-Mozos & Ziv Hellman & Eyal Winter, 2012. "Spectrum Value for Coalitional Games," Discussion Paper Series dp618, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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