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A Model of Migration


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A simple game-theoretic model of migration is proposed, in which the players are animals, the strategies are territories in a landscape to which they may migrate, and the payoffs for each animal are determined by its ultimate location and the number of other animals there. If the payoff to an animal is a decreasing function of the number of other animals sharing its territory, we show the resultant game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE). Furthermore, this PSNE is generated via "natural" myopic behavior on the part of the animals. Finally, we compare this type of game with congestion games and potential games.

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Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1088.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Dec 1994
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1088

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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Cited by:
  1. Abderrahmane ZIAD & Samir SBABOU & Hatem SMAOUI, 2011. "Nash equilibria in nonsymmetric singleton congestion games with exact partition," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201115, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  2. Voorneveld, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Megen, F.J.C. van & Tijs, S.H. & Facchini, G., 1999. "Congestion Games and Potentials Reconsidered," Discussion Paper 1999-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Uniqueness of User Equilibrium in Transportation Networks with Heterogeneous Commuters," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 494, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 14 Nov 2002.
  4. Tercieux, O.R.C. & Voorneveld, M., 2005. "The Cutting Power of Preparation," Discussion Paper 2005-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Marja-Liisa Halko & Hannu Salonen, 2008. "Congestion, Coordination and Matching," Discussion Papers 28, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  6. Roughgarden, Tim & Tardos, Eva, 2004. "Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 389-403, May.
  7. Tim Roughgarden, 2010. "Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 193-236, January.
  8. Megen, F.J.C. van & Facchini, G. & Borm, P.E.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1996. "Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maimizer," Discussion Paper 1996-13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. Olivier Tercieux & Mark Voorneveld, 2010. "The cutting power of preparation," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 85-101, February.


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