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A Model of Migration

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Author Info
Thomas Quint (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
Martin Shubik () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

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Abstract

A simple game-theoretic model of migration is proposed, in which the players are animals, the strategies are territories in a landscape to which they may migrate, and the payoffs for each animal are determined by its ultimate location and the number of other animals there. If the payoff to an animal is a decreasing function of the number of other animals sharing its territory, we show the resultant game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE). Furthermore, this PSNE is generated via "natural" myopic behavior on the part of the animals. Finally, we compare this type of game with congestion games and potential games.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d10b/d1088.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1088.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Dec 1994
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1088

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  1. Megen, F. van & Facchini, G. & Borm, P., 1996. "Strong Nash equilibria and the potential maximizer," Discussion Paper 13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Uniqueness of User Equilibrium in Transportation Networks with Heterogeneous Commuters," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 494, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 14 Nov 2002. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tercieux, Olivier & Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "The cutting power of preparation," Discussion Paper 94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Voorneveld, M. & Borm, P. & Megen, F. van, 1999. "Congestion games and potentials reconsidered," Discussion Paper 98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Marja-Liisa Halko & Hannu Salonen, 2008. "Congestion, Coordination and Matching," Discussion Papers 28, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.

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