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A Model of Migration

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Abstract

A simple game-theoretic model of migration is proposed, in which the players are animals, the strategies are territories in a landscape to which they may migrate, and the payoffs for each animal are determined by its ultimate location and the number of other animals there. If the payoff to an animal is a decreasing function of the number of other animals sharing its territory, we show the resultant game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE). Furthermore, this PSNE is generated via "natural" myopic behavior on the part of the animals. Finally, we compare this type of game with congestion games and potential games.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Quint & Martin Shubik, 1994. "A Model of Migration," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1088, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1088
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d10/d1088.pdf
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    1. Tercieux, O.R.C. & Voorneveld, M., 2005. "The Cutting Power of Preparation," Other publications TiSEM 75173341-627f-4eb2-91f1-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Holzman, Ron & Law-Yone, Nissan, 1997. "Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 85-101, October.
    3. Le Breton, Michel & Shapoval, Alexander & Weber, Shlomo, 2021. "A game-theoretical model of the landscape theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 41-46.
    4. Marja-Liisa Halko & Hannu Salonen, 2008. "Congestion, Coordination and Matching," Discussion Papers 28, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    5. Samir Sbabou & Hatem Smaoui & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "A formula for Nash equilibria in monotone singleton congestion games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 334-339.
    6. Samir Sbabou & Hatem Smaoui & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Jeux de congestion finis à choix unique : Théorie, Equilibres, Applications -Calculs et Complexités-," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201303, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    7. Roughgarden, Tim & Tardos, Eva, 2004. "Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 389-403, May.
    8. Tim Roughgarden, 2010. "Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(1), pages 193-236, January.
    9. Abderrahmane ZIAD & Samir SBABOU & Hatem SMAOUI, 2011. "Nash equilibria in nonsymmetric singleton congestion games with exact partition," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201115, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    10. Abderrahmane ZIAD & Samir SBABOU & Hatem SMAOUI, CEMOI, 2011. "Nonsymmetric singleton congestion games: case of two resources," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201113, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    11. van Megen, F.J.C. & Facchini, G. & Borm, P.E.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1996. "Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maimizer," Other publications TiSEM 4bb6ee96-1a0c-44ee-8685-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Hideo Konishi, 2004. "Uniqueness of User Equilibrium in Transportation Networks with Heterogeneous Commuters," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 315-330, August.
    13. Olivier Tercieux & Mark Voorneveld, 2010. "The cutting power of preparation," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 71(1), pages 85-101, February.

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