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Worker Trust, System Vulnerability, and the Performance of Work Groups Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Schotter, A.
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What we find is that teh match between vulnerability and trust is a key ingredient into what makes a group of workers work well together along with the type of coordination problem that is created by the equilibrium of the incentive scheme.
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number
96-32.
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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: 1996Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:96-32Contact details of provider: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012 Phone: (212) 998-8936 Fax: (212) 995-3932 Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html More information through EDIRC
Order Information: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012 Email:
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Keywords: GAME THEORY ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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Industrial Sociology (FCT-UNL)
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Nalbantian, Haig & Schotter, Andrew, 1994.
"Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study ,"
Working Papers
94-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990.
"Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-48, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Montmarquette, Claude & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Villeval, Marie-Claire & Zeiliger, Romain, 2004.
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IZA Discussion Papers
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Other versions: Joshua Herries & Daniel I. Rees & Jeffrey S. Zax, 2003.
"Interdependence in worker productivity ,"
Journal of Applied Econometrics ,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 585-604.
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"Wages and Reciprocity in the Workplace ,"
Development and Comp Systems
0409064, EconWPA.
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Rafael Di Tella & Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2008.
"Reality versus Propaganda in the Formation of Beliefs about Privatization ,"
NBER Working Papers
14483, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Ariane Lambert Mogiliansky & Shmuel Zamir & Herve Zwirn, 2003.
"Type Indeterminacy: A Model of the KT(Kahneman-Tversky)-man ,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp343, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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Christine Harbring & Bernd Irlenbusch, 2005.
"How Many Winners Are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1777, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2002.
"Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company ,"
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