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Worker Trust, System Vulnerability, and the Performance of Work Groups

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Author Info

  • Schotter, A.

Abstract

What we find is that teh match between vulnerability and trust is a key ingredient into what makes a group of workers work well together along with the type of coordination problem that is created by the equilibrium of the incentive scheme.

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9383/RR96-32.PDF
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 96-32.

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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:96-32

Contact details of provider:
Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Email:
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Keywords: GAME THEORY;

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  1. Industrial Sociology (FCT-UNL)

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