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The Social Value of Public Information with Costly Information Acquisition

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  • Luca Colombo

    ()
    (DISCE, Università Cattolica)

  • Gianluca Femminis

    ()
    (DISCE, Università Cattolica)

Abstract

In a beauty contest framework, we show that more precise public information contributes to higher welfare when the precision of private information is endogenous. We consider a Stackelberg game in which public authorities decide the accuracy of public information taking into account how this affects the acquisition of private information and the choice of individual actions in equilibrium. Because the acquisition of private information is costly, an increase in the precision of public information increases welfare by reducing the incentives for acquisition of private information, thereby inducing socially valuable savings of private resources.

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File URL: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza/Quaderni/ief0073.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) in its series DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza with number ief0073.

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Length: nn pages 16
Date of creation: Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie3:ief0073

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Web page: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza
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Keywords: Public information; private information; coordination; welfare;

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References

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  1. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 718-742, 04.
  2. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 91-98, May.
  3. Christian Hellwig & Laura Veldkamp, 2009. "Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 223-251.
  4. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1103-1142, 07.
  5. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  6. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2006. "Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 448-452, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Ui, Takashi, 2014. "The Social Value of Public Information with Convex Costs of Information Acquisition," Discussion Papers 2014-05, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  2. Stefano Colombo, 2008. "Discriminatory prices, endogenous locations and the Prisoner Dilemma problem," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0079, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  3. Venky Venkateswaran & Luis Llosa, 2012. "Efficiency With Endogenous Information Choice," 2012 Meeting Papers 660, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Angelo Baglioni & Andrea Monticini, 2008. "The intraday interest rate under a liquidity crisis: the case of August 2007," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0083, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  5. Luca Colombo & Herbert Dawid & Kordian Kabus, 2007. "When do Thick Venture Capital Markets Foster Innovation? An Evolutionary Analysis," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0074, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  6. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2014. "Information acquisition interactions in two-player quadratic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 455-485, May.
  7. Sandro Brusco & Luca Colombo & Umberto Galmarini, 2010. "Local Governments Tax Autonomy, Lobbying, and Welfare," Department of Economics Working Papers 10-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  8. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "H.P. Minsky And Policies To Countervail Crises," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  9. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "The Debate on the Crisis: Recent Reappraisals of the Concept of Functional Finance," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0105, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  10. James, Jonathan G. & Lawler, Phillip, 2012. "Heterogeneous information quality; strategic complementarities and optimal policy design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 342-352.
  11. Maria Flavia Ambrosanio & Massimo Bordignon & Floriana Cerniglia, 2008. "Constitutional reforms, fiscal decentralization and regional fiscal flows in Italy," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0084, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).

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