For Whom is MAI? A theoretical Perspective on Multilateral Agreements on Investments
AbstractWhy do we observe some LDCs objecting the prospect of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), although they have been keen to liberalize investment in preferential agreements in recent years? In this paper, we analyse the issue of MAI implementation and assess the welfare consequences of such kind of agreements. In our model, participation to MAI involves a trade-off between less rent extraction from multinational firms (MNEs) and more abundant FDI in‡ows. At equilibrium, either all countries enter MAI, or all countries stay out, or only some of them enter. Coordination problems may induce multiple equilibria: the three types of equilibria may coexist. So, the implementation of MAI may depend not only on structural factors but also on the general ”political climate”. When all countries join MAI, world welfare is maximized because this minimizes the hold-up problem faced by MNEs and stimulates investment. However, in an asymmetric world, welfare gains are not guaranteed for all countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano in its series Development Working Papers with number 151.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2001
Date of revision:
Foreign Direct Investment; International Agreements; Incomplete;
Other versions of this item:
- Turrini, Alessandro Antonio & Urban, Dieter M, 2001. "For Whom is MAI? A Theoretical Perspective on Multilateral Agreements on Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 2774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
- O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
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