Stratégies de revente à perte et réglementation
AbstractWe study price competition on a homogenous good market between a hypermarket and a small shop. The hypermarket also offers another independent product whereas the small shop is assumed to be geographically closer to consumers. We show the existence of an equilibrium where the hypermarket resells at a loss the good that the small shop does not offer. A loss leader banning law may in such a context lower consumers'surplus. We further explore some implications concerning French regulation by competition authorities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 2000-52.
Date of creation: 2000
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- Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle, 2004.
"Loss-leaders Banning Laws as Vertical Restraints,"
2004-19, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Allain Marie-Laure & Chambolle Claire, 2005. "Loss-Leaders Banning Laws as Vertical Restraints," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-25, February.
- Rey, Patrick & Chen, Zhijun, 2010.
"Loss Leading as an Exploitative Practice,"
TSE Working Papers
10-218, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Dec 2011.
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