The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Sharing International Rivers with Bifurcations
AbstractWe consider the problem of sharing water from a river among the group of countries located along it. The benefit of each country depends on the amount of water it consumes. An allocation of the water is efficient when it maximizes the total benefits of the countries. The problem of finding a fair welfare distribution can be modeled as a cooperative game. We introduce a new allocation rule, called the sequential equal surplus division, for sharing the total welfare resulting form the cooperation of countries along a river with bifurcations. This rule obeys the so-called Territorial Integration of all Basin States doctrine, which emphasizes compromise and fairness among countries. We provide two axiomatic characterizations of this rule.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CRESE in its series Working Papers with number 2012-02.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision:
River TU-game; Sequential Equal Surplus Division; Water allocation; Standard solution; Consistency; Fairness; Amalgamation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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