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Go Public or Stay Private: A Theory of Entrepreneurial Choice

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Author Info
Boot, Arnoud W A
Gopalan, Radhakrishnan
Thakor, Anjan

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Abstract

In this Paper we analyse an entrepreneur/manager’s choice between private and public ownership in a setting in which management needs some ‘elbow room’ or autonomy to manage the firm optimally. In public capital markets, the corporate governance regime in place exposes the firm to exogenous controls, so that management may lack the autonomy it desires. By contrast, private ownership can provide management with the desired autonomy due to the possibility of precisely-calibrated private contracting. The disadvantage of private ownership (relative to public ownership) is that it imposes a cost of illiquidity on those who provide financing. We explore this trade-off between managerial autonomy and the cost of capital in a simple setting and draw a number of new testable implications.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4219.

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Date of creation: Feb 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4219

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Related research
Keywords: ownership structures; stockmarket listing;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Chemmanur, Thomas J & Fulghieri, Paolo, 1999. "A Theory of the Going-Public Decision," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(2), pages 249-79.
  2. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul & Zechner, Josef, 1994. "Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1097-1130, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 2001. "The Many Faces of Information Disclosure," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 1021-57.
    Other versions:
  4. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Black, Bernard S. & Gilson, Ronald J., 1998. "Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus stock markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 243-277, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1999. "Diversity of Opinion and Financing of New Technologies," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(1-2), pages 68-89, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Ernst Maug, 1998. "Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 65-98, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Marco Pagano & Ailsa Röell, 1998. "The Choice Of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, And The Decision To Go Public," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 187-225, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, 2003. "The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong?," NBER Working Papers 9613, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Marco Pagano & Fabio Panetta & and Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 27-64, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Kent Daniel & David Hirshleifer & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 1998. "Investor Psychology and Security Market Under- and Overreactions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(6), pages 1839-1885, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Bhide, Amar, 1993. "The hidden costs of stock market liquidity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 31-51, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Shah, Salman & Thakor, Anjan V, 1988. " Private versus Public Ownership: Investment, Ownership Distribution, and Optimality," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(1), pages 41-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Josh Lerner & Antoinetter Schoar, 2002. "The Illiquidity Puzzle: Theory and Evidence from Private Equity," NBER Working Papers 9146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, 2003. "Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-24, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  17. Zingales, Luigi, 1995. "Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(3), pages 425-48, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Burkart, Mike & Gromb, Denis & Panunzi, Fausto, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728, August.
  19. Mello, Antonio S. & Parsons, John E., 1998. "Going public and the ownership structure of the firm," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 79-109, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Pagano, Marco, 1993. "The flotation of companies on the stock market : A coordination failure model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1101-1125, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Avanidhar Subrahmanyam & Sheridan Titman, 1999. "The Going-Public Decision and the Development of Financial Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(3), pages 1045-1082, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1998. "Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 1-25, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ljungqvist, Alexander & Boehmer, Ekkehart, 2004. "On the decision to go public : Evidence from privately-held firms," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2004,16, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  2. Richard J. Rosen & Scott B. Smart & Chad J. Zutter, 2005. "Why do firms go public? evidence from the banking industry," Working Paper Series WP-05-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
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