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Crises and Punishment: Moral Hazard and the Pre-1914 International Financial Architecture

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  • Flandreau, Marc

Abstract

This Paper argues that the backbone of the pre-1914 international financial architecture was the concern about moral hazard. No decentralized system can leave without safeguards against free riding and this typically means that problem countries must find by themselves the means to fix their domestic problems. We review the origins of crises as well as the remedies that were commonly applied one century ago and find that the international financial world was fairly similar to the setting in which we live today, and this for the same reasons. Today, just like one century ago, in the absence of an international lender of last resort with huge regulatory powers, countries must muddle through, with the occasional - and imperfect - help of international finance.

Suggested Citation

  • Flandreau, Marc, 2003. "Crises and Punishment: Moral Hazard and the Pre-1914 International Financial Architecture," CEPR Discussion Papers 3742, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3742
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael D. Bordo & Christopher M. Meissner, 2005. "The Role of Foreign Currency Debt in Financial Crises: 1880-1913 vs. 1972-1997," NBER Working Papers 11897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Bordo, Michael D. & Meissner, Christopher M., 2006. "The role of foreign currency debt in financial crises: 1880-1913 versus 1972-1997," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(12), pages 3299-3329, December.
    3. Flandreau, Marc & Flores, Juan, 2010. "Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: Relationship banking and conditionality lending in the London market for government debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 7915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Davide Furceri & Aleksandra Zdzienicka, 2012. "The Consequences of Banking Crises for Public Debt," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 289-307, December.
    5. Sasha Indarte, 2017. "Contagion via Financial Intermediaries in Pre-1914 Sovereign Debt Markets," 2017 Meeting Papers 1141, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Michael D. Bordo & Christopher M. Meissner, 2007. "Financial Crises, 1880-1913: The Role of Foreign Currency Debt," NBER Chapters, in: The Decline of Latin American Economies: Growth, Institutions, and Crises, pages 139-194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Esteves, Rui & Eichengreen, Barry, 2019. "The Trials of the Trilemma: International Finance 1870-2017," CEPR Discussion Papers 13465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Marc Flandreau & Juan Flores, 2011. "Bondholders vs. bond-sellers? Investment banks and conditionality lending in the London market for foreign government debt, 1815-1913," Working Papers 0002, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
    9. Basak, Gopal K. & Das, Pranab Kumar & Rohit, Allena, 2017. "Capital inflow-terms of trade ‘nexus’: Does it lead to financial crisis?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 18-29.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral hazard; Financial architecture; Financial crises; Self insurance; Relationship banking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

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