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Selecting Valuation Distributions: Non-Price Decisions of Multi-Product Firms

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  • Schmutzler, Armin
  • Bossard, Stefanie

Abstract

This paper analyzes decisions of multi-product firms regarding product selection, innovation and advertising as choices of consumer valuation distributions. We show that a profit-maximizing monopolist chooses these distributions so as to maximize the dispersion of the valuation differences between goods across consumers. By contrast, she chooses the willingness-to-pay to be maximally or minimally dispersed, depending on the set of available distributions. In our benchmark model with uniform valuation differences, prices are increasing in valuation difference heterogeneity, but in more general settings this is not necessarily true. Moreover, the relation between willingness-to-pay heterogeneity and prices may well be non-monotone. Over wide parameter ranges, the firm's choice of valuation distribution does not maximize net consumer surplus. This problem is exacerbated when the firm has access to strategies that distort valuation heterogeneity or willingness-to-pay heterogeneity.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmutzler, Armin & Bossard, Stefanie, 2021. "Selecting Valuation Distributions: Non-Price Decisions of Multi-Product Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 16655, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16655
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • M30 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - General

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