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Fiscal Rules and the Budget Process

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  • Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria

Abstract

This paper examines the rationale for the imposition of fiscal rules as a way to reduce budgetary imbalances. It presents theoretical arguments for the existence of a ‘fiscal deficit bias’ and the empirical evidence on the economic, political and institutional factors leading to this bias. In the context of these findings, it discusses the potential role of legal constraints on the level of key fiscal variables, and of reforms in budgetary procedures in enhancing fiscal discipline. It also evaluates proposals for budgetary reform in Italy.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1664.

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Date of creation: Jun 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1664

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Keywords: Budget Deficits; Budget Process; Fiscal Rules; Government Spending;

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Cited by:
  1. Frank Bodmer, 2006. "The Swiss Debt Brake: How it Works and What Can Go Wrong," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 142(III), pages 307-330, September.
  2. Chakraborty, Pinaki & Dash, Bharatee Bhusana, 2013. "Fiscal Reforms, Fiscal Rule and Development Spending: How Indian States have Performed?," Working Papers 13/122, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
  3. Francesco Lagona & Fabio Padovano, 2007. "A nonlinear principal component analysis of the relationship between budget rules and fiscal performance in the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 401-436, March.
  4. Robert A.J. Dur & Ben D. Peletier & Otto H. Swank, 1998. "The Effect of Fiscal Rules on Public Investment if Budget Deficits Are Politically Motivated," Public Economics 9801003, EconWPA, revised 25 Feb 1999.
  5. Magda E. Kandil & Hanan Morsy, 2010. "Fiscal Stimulus and Credibility in Emerging Countries," IMF Working Papers 10/123, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Gerry Boyle; & Jim O'Leary, 1997. "Controlling Public Spending in Times of Plenty," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n741197, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
  7. Guiseppe Pisauro, 2001. "Intergovernmental Relations and Fiscal Discipline," IMF Working Papers 01/65, International Monetary Fund.

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