Training and Unions
AbstractThe paper examines the optimal level of training investment when trained workers are mobile, wage contracts are time-consistent, and training comprises both specific and general skills. It is shown that, in the absence of a social planner, the firm has ex-post monopsonistic power that drives trained workers’ wages below the socially-optimal level. The emergence of trade union bargaining at the firm level can increase social welfare, however, by counterbalancing the firm’s ex-post monopsonistic power in wage determination. Local union-firm wage bargaining ensures that the post-training wage is set sufficiently high to deter at least some quits, so that the number of workers the firm trains is nearer the socially-optimal number. The paper therefore sheds some light on the stylized facts that unions are associated with fewer quits and more firm-provided training.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1573.
Date of creation: Feb 1997
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
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- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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- James M. Malcomson & James W. Maw & Barry McCormick, 2002.
"General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
696, CESifo Group Munich.
- Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2003. "General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 197-227, April.
- Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2000. "General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0021, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- James Malcomson & James W. Maw, 2002. "General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy," Economics Series Working Papers 86, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Verner, Dorte, 1999. "Wage and productivity gaps - evidence from Ghana," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2168, The World Bank.
- Verner, Dorte, 1999. "Are wages and productivity in Zimbabwe affected by human capital investment and international trade?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2101, The World Bank.
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