Monetary Integration and Economic Convergence
AbstractRecent research in contract theory views ownership as a substitute for complete contracts. In this paper this approach is applied to monetary integration. Countries face a coordination problem when conducting monetary policy: negative spillovers ensure uncoordinated policy generates too high inflation. Ex ante, policy-makers can undertake politically costly economic reform. This has a positive spillover because it improves the outcome of the monetary policy game. Ex post, contracting over policy may be possible, however, it is supposed that ex-ante contracting over reform and monetary policy, is not. This paper analyses when monetary union is a good substitute for this inability to commit.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1561.
Date of creation: Jan 1997
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- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
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