This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Market share and price in Dutch home care: market power or quality?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Ilaria Mosca
Marc Pomp
Victoria Shestalova ()
Abstract

A change of legislation in 2004 of the Dutch Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (EMEA) allowed for more competition among suppliers of home care. The new law made it possible for the 32 regional healthcare purchasing agencies to contract suppliers selectively and to negotiate over prices and quality. Since, at least in some regions, one or two providers dominate the market, there are concerns about the effect of providers’ market power on the pricing of home care services. This paper tries to assess whether these concerns are justified. Using complete data on contracted prices and quantities for 2004-2006, we find that, indeed, providers with a larger market share are able to contract at a higher price. We also find significant differences in contracted prices for some healthcare purchasing agencies, which points towards differences in their regional situations and/or policies. It is conceivable that both differences in market share and differences in price are driven by unobserved differences in quality. However, our analysis based on quality data reported in a consumer survey does not support this explanation.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cpb.nl/eng/pub/cpbreeksen/discussie/95/disc95.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in its series CPB Discussion Papers with number 95.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpb:discus:95

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Postbus 80510, 2508 GM Den Haag
Phone: (070) 338 33 80
Fax: (070) 338 33 50
Email:
Web page: http://www.cpb.nl/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: market structure; bargaining; healthcare;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Halbersma, R.S. & Mikkers, M.C. & Motchenkova, E. & Seinen, I., 2007. "Market Structure and Hospital-Insurer Bargaining in the Netherlands," Discussion Paper 2007-006, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Melnick, Glenn A. & Zwanziger, Jack & Bamezai, Anil & Pattison, Robert, 1992. "The effects of market structure and bargaining position on hospital prices," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 217-233, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.