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Optimal redistribution with unobservable disability: welfarist versus non-welfarist social objectives

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Author Info
PESTIEAU, Pierre (UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))
RACIONERO, Maria

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Abstract

This paper examines the optimal non linear income and commodity tax when the same labor disutility can receive two alternative interpretations, taste for leisure and disability, but the disability is not readily observable. We compare the optimal policyunder alternative social objectives, welfarist and non-welfarist, and conclude that the non-welfarist objective, in which the planner gives a higher weight to the disutility of labour of the disabled individuals, is the only reasonable specification. It has some foundation in the theory of responsability; further, unlike the other specifications it yields an optimal solution that may involve a lower labour supply requirement from disabled individuals.

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File URL: http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2007_35.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2007035.

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Date of creation: 01 May 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2007035

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Related research
Keywords: optimal non-linear taxation; quasi-linear preferences; asymmetric information; responsibility;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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