Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Politiques fiscales optimales pour les bas revenus et principe de compensation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Laurence Jacquet
  • Dirk Van de gaer

    ()
    (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise and THEMA
    Universiteit Gent et CORE)

Abstract

We consider an economy in which agents di¤er in terms of productivity (that may be either high or low) as well as in their preferences for labour. Individuals decide whether or not they enter the labour force. In this context and under asymmetric information, the optimal tax schedules derived under the Egalitarian Equivalence criterion (Fleurbaey et Maniquet [2005, 2006]) always satisfy the compensation principle (for distinct productivity levels). Under the criterion of Roemer [1993, 1998] and the weighted maximin à la Boadway et al. [2002], the optimal tax schedules may satisfy the compensation principle while the standard criteria in the optimal taxation literature fail to do so. Numerical simulations illustrate our analytical results and highlight how the parameters in the model affect the participation tax.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.u-cergy.fr/thema/repec/2013-04.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2013-04.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2013-04

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 33, boulevard du port - 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex
Phone: 33 1 34 25 60 63
Fax: 33 1 34 25 62 33
Email:
Web page: http://thema.u-cergy.fr
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: optimal taxation; compensation principle; heterogeneous preferences for labour;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2006. "Disability Testing and Retirement," CEPR Discussion Papers 5546, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. CREMER, Helmuth & LOZACHMEUR, Jean-Marie & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Optimal retirements and disability benefits with audit," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1836, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. JACQUET, Laurence & VAN DE GAER, Dirk, . "A comparison of optimal tax policies when compensation or responsibility matter," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2421, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. BOADWAY, Robin & CUFF, Katherine & MARCHAND, Maurice, . "Optimal income taxation with quasi-linear preferences revisited," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1466, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Schokkaert, Erik & Van de gaer, Dirk & Vandenbroucke, Frank & Luttens, Roland Iwan, 2004. "Responsibility sensitive egalitarianism and optimal linear income taxation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 151-182, September.
  6. Martin Hellwig, 2007. "A Contribution to the Theory of Optimal Utilitarian Income Taxation," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2007_2, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  7. Louis Kaplow, 2008. "Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences," NBER Working Papers 14170, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2005. "Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 93-127, 09.
  9. Pestieau, Pierre & Racionero, María, 2009. "Optimal redistribution with unobservable disability: Welfarist versus non-welfarist social objectives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 636-644, August.
  10. Robin Boadway & Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau & María del Mar Racionero, 2002. "Optimal Redistribution with Heterogeneous Preferences for Leisure," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(4), pages 475-498, October.
  11. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2012. "Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653591, September.
  12. Dirk Van de gaer & Marc Fleurbaey & Walter Bossert, 1999. "Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 35-55.
  13. Emmanuel Saez, 2002. "Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1039-1073, August.
  14. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2009. "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 537-560, 03.
  15. Philippe Chone & Guy Laroque, 2001. "Optimal Incentives for Labor Force Participation," Working Papers 2001-26, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  16. Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau & María Racionero, 2003. "Optimal redistribution when different workers are indistinguishable," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(4), pages 911-922, November.
  17. Kanbur, Ravi & Tuomala, Matti, 1994. " Inherent Inequality and the Optimal Graduation of Marginal Tax Rates," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(2), pages 275-82.
  18. Robin Boadway & Laurence Jacquet, 2006. "Optimal Marginal and Average Income Taxation under Maxi-min," Working Papers 1073, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  19. Fleurbaey,Marc & Maniquet,François, 2011. "A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521715348.
  20. Ebert, Udo, 1992. "A reexamination of the optimal nonlinear income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 47-73, October.
  21. Kaplow Louis, 2008. "Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-30, September.
  22. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
  23. Diamond, P., 1980. "Income taxation with fixed hours of work," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 101-110, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2013-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marion Oury).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.